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Y. Stamos on D. Panagia’s The
Political Life of Sensation
1 Davide Panagia, The Political Life of Sensation. Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 2009.
Pp 232.ISBN:978-0822344797.
2 The Political  Life of  Sensation is an ambitious work. It  attempts not only to develop
further some recent and important studies in cultural and visual theory (M. Fried, L.
Marin,  L.  Marks,  J.  Batler)  or  to  assess  their  possible  contributions  to  contemporary
political thought, but also to intervene and shift the focus of theoretical and political
attention beyond what Panagia calls “the rule of narrative” and the commitment to the
narratocratic  qualities  of  appearances.  According  to  Panagia  the  majority  of
historiography (which "sets the narratocratic standards for theoretical engagement") and
of cultural studies today is ruled by a powerful narratocracy. His main argument is that
the narratocratic reduction of an aesthetic, cultural or political object to its possibility of
making  sense,  i.e,  of  being  meaningfully  expressed/ communicated,  written  or  read
according  to  grammatical  and  syntactical  rules,  hides  all  the  other  possibilities  or
potentialities of appearing,  and delimits,  thereby,  access to other democratic forms of
political attention and engagement. Panagia’s theory of sensation attempts to extend our
conceptions  of  politics  by  turning  our  attention  to  the  heterogeneous  world  of
appearances  and  by  defining  democratic  political  life  as  the  active  and  constant
movement  of  reconfiguration  of  the  sensible,  that  is,  of  the  different  regimes  of
perceptual  part-taking  which  determine  what  can  count  as  common  perception,
experience or sense.  
3 Drawing mainly on the aesthetic  writings of  Kant,  Deleuze and Ranciere,  Panagia
wants  to  show  and  describe  the  political  and  “ethopoetic”  (Foucault)  moment  of
sensation:  far  from  having  to  rely  on  our  organoleptic  certainties,  namely  on  the
supposedly  natural  correspondences  between  body  organs  and  acts  of  perception,
sensation is the moment of interruption and reconfiguration of such correspondences, in
other words, the moment of interruption of the sensible, “of what makes sense and can be
sensed” (3). Taking some examples of the modern life of sensation, from the “viewing
effects” of Francis Bacon’s paintings to the public displays of chocolate preparation in the
piazzas of Italy as a protest to the standardization of taste by the EU, Panagia gives us to
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think the following paradox: sensation is dissensual, organolepsis disorganizes the body
(146-147). These examples provide us also with some of the modern sites of dislocation or
disfiguration of subjectivity. According to Panagia, the concept of sensation comprises
both  the  power  of  disfiguration  and  the  possibility  reconfiguration  of  modern
subjectivity. The experience of sensation is or can always be an inventive experience; it
can always set free new and imaginative ways of political action, ways of “breaking fresh
ground and acting without precedents” (Arendt) (5). The question posed in this book is
above all an ethico-political question: how does one respond to the reconfiguration or
emergence of a new political subjectivity?
4 Narratocracy and its politics of recognition is just one way of responding to this question.
It is just one perceptual form of knowledge which has become, however, the dominant
regime of perception in the theoretical and historical analysis of political phenomena.
(Panagia  does  not  tell  us  how this  came to  pass;  was  it  only  a  matter  of  historical
contingency?) As the organization of the perceptual field according to the imperative of
rendering the objects of perception readable, narratocracy is, moreover, “an ethopoetic
modality of knowledge” (13): it is committed to give an account or justify the sense of an
appearance  by  providing  a  narrative  or  story  line,  and  by  constituting  the  modern
democratic subject as a literate or reading subject.  In the first chapter, “From Nomos to
Nomad,” Panagia follows a line of thought from Kant and up to Deleuze and Ranciere in
order  to  bring  to  light  a  “democratic  form  of  nonsense,”  i.e.,  a  number  of  diverse
modalities  of  political  expression  and  part-taking  that  remain  irreducible  to  the
narratocratic or “nomologic imperative of making sense” and to the deliberative mode of
communication (38).
5 Panagia locates the ultimate merit of Kant’s aesthetic writings in the democratic and
egalitarian character of his Critique of Judgement. The experience of the beautiful is a
radical democratic moment in aesthetic judgement. As Kant put it, “there can be no rule
to which anyone is  to be compelled to recognize anything as beautiful”:  anyone can
experience  beauty  because  no  one  can  determine  normatively  the  conditions  of  its
existence.  Crucial  for Panagia’s  argumentation is  Kant’s  reference to the moment (or
durational intensity) of immediacy in aesthetic experience as well as to the disinterested
interest that arises in the encounter of the beautiful object (31). The claim that there are
no a priori rules to legislate a judgement of the beautiful, that beauty is disinterested and
egalitarian, has consequences for the Kantian theory of the subject: the experience of the
beautiful  cannot  be grounded on a pre-constituted subjectivity.  On the contrary,  the
immediacy of the aesthetic experience ungrounds this subjectivity since it interrupts an
interest-oriented evaluation of the aesthetic object and compels a form of reflection that
cannot rely on commonly shared conditions for the distribution of sense (23, 28). 
6 One of the most interesting points of Panagia’s argumentation lies in the relation of
proximity that he establishes between the thinking of Kant and that of Deleuze, between
Kant’s disinterestedness and his claim that “no faculty possesses the authority to legislate
taste,” and Deleuze’s “body without organs,” his claim that “no one organ of perception
has the authority to legislate sensation” (147). In the rest of the book Panagia attempts to
link the Deleuzian “body without organs,” this democratic body in which no organ has
any priority or authority over the other, with the question of the constitution of the
modern and democratic subject of perception through such diverse practices as that of
speaking, eating, viewing and touching. Panagia starts with the affiliation of democracy
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and  noise,  and  he  goes  on  with  the  link  between  democratic  citizenship  and  the
circulation of images and flavours. 
7 In the following chapter “The Piazza, the Edicola, and the Noise of the Utterance” Panagia
broaches the possibility of “an aural history of democratic culture,” (46) and reveals the
possibility of “a democratic form nonsense” (61). This possibility however does not refer
to  the  content  of  the  utterance  but  to  who  gets  to  decide  what  a  meaningful  or  a
meaningless  political  utterance  sounds  like.  Hence  Panagia’s  question:  can  the
preparation of chocolate in the piazzas of Italy be considered a political utterance? The
narratocratic  model  of  cultural  studies  and  historiography  which  puts  semantic
exchange, the etymologies and the historico-semantic genealogies of political concepts at
the center of the investigation, reduces the appearance of a political utterance to the
“shape of a sign” (46). By remaining attentive to the conceptual side of the sign, what
Saussure called “the signified,” narratocracy ignores an important factor of language: the
phonic signifier or the “sound-image” of the sign “that sources our sensory impressions”
(48).  The  narratocratic  commitment  to  the  history  of  concepts  results  in  a  de  facto
partition of the social body of the polity between those who can and cannot speak or
write, between appropriate and inappropriate political sounds, etc. In the final analysis
what counts as political must correspond to a way of reading typographical inscriptions.
With such divisions in place, the baking of chocolate, along with a series of sonorous
events taking place throughout the piazzas of Italy (and especially around the edicola, the
newsstand), will never be registered as a proper political utterance: but as a “blabber or
worse  as  a  cultural  extravagance”  (79).  Given  the  fact  that  modern  democracy  is
characterized by the potential simultaneity of diverse forms of perceptual part-taking
(49) the question is: should we give normative priority in political communication to one
mode  of  address  or  utterance  (purely  linguistic,  meaningful,  sensible,  allowing
deliberation,  consensus,  tact,  politesse and harmony)  against  all  others?  Pursuing an
aesthetico-political  account  of  the  utterance  that  goes  beyond  its  semantic  and
grammatical limits, beyond the “stability of the written word” (73), Panagia shows what is
politically lost in forgetting the sound, the interruptive noise, of the utterance. If there
was never a “quiet” and “peaceful” democratic movement or uprising, if the “first pitch”
of  all  revolutionary  utterances  is  “an  interruptive  noise”  this  is  because  democratic
politics has always been a politics, a political “art of noise” and nonsense, i.e. interruption
of the deliberative, consensual, harmonious mode of communication, of the fiction of a
common language of deliberation (52, 62).
8 In the following chapters Panagia passes from the literal subject of narratocracy and
the noisy subject of democratic politics to the modern citizen subject who is also a tasting
and a viewing subject. Chapter three, “Machiavelli’s Theory of Sensation and Florence’s Vita
Festiva,” exposes the narratocratic  assumptions which underline the historiographical
accounts of festival culture in Renaissance Italy and of Machiavelli’s political thought.
The main target here is the Cambridge school of historiography. An historico-theoretical
evaluation of Machiavelli’s contribution to the early-modern political thought cannot be
exhausted  to  a  conceptual  analysis  of  his  republicanism.  From the  perspective  of  a
political theory of sensation, a hermeneutic approach which is focused on the written
letter of Machiavellis’s work remains entirely dependent on the supposedly unalterable
and necessary character of certain organoleptic correspondences: for instance between
sight and reading, touching and writing (76).
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9 As Panagia argues, it is his commitment to the political life of sensation which leads
Machiavelli, in his account of Fortuna and of the istraordinary virtu of the Prince, to an
effective disruption of those organoleptic configurations that constitute the narratocratic
disposition of a sensing body: the eyes give sight, the mouth gives taste etc. Focusing on
his “theory of riscontro” which informs the Prince and a well-known autobiographical
letter to Francesco Vettori, Panagia shows that Machiavelli was sensitive to and actually
reported  the  growing  diversity  of  intensities  of  Vita  Festiva impacting  on  the  body,
disfiguring and reconfiguring its organs of perception, transforming the mouth, the eyes
and the hand into nothing less than political organs of part-taking in vivere civile (civic
life).  
10 In chapter 4 "The Viewing Subject", Panagia poses the question of the status of the eyes
(and of the mouth in the next chapter) as complex organs of political part-taking with
respect to the relationship between citizenship, subjectivity and the circulation of images
(and flavours.) If it is true that modern societies continue “to be more and more complicit
to acts of image-creation and transmission” then “one of the key challenges posed to
contemporary democratic theory today is how to engage the image.” With this challenge
in mind, it is again by going against the narratocratic commitment to the reading subject
and to the “readerly posture of attention” (120) that Panagia poses the question of the
modern  citizen.  “Though  the  citizen  subject may  have  been  a  reading  subject,  the
contemporary  citizen  subject  is  a  viewing  subject”  ...  “the  most  pernicious  political
battles are fought at the level of audience ratings and viewership” (99). Panagia describes
the political effects of visuality by drawing on the visual studies and aesthetic theory of
Marin, Fried and Deleuze. What these authors maintain is that the viewing effects of
painting (for example, that of Caravaggio and of Bacon) cannot be reduced to a mere
seeing, to an ocular visuality, but they involve a “haptic visuality” as well in which not
only the eyes but the entire body is at play in a configuration and reconfiguration of
sense experience  (109). If the aesthetic experience of those paintings -  but also of other
visual objects, Panagia refers extensively to the “Abu Graib photographs,” the “Rodney
King video,” the film “The Ring” - is a proper political experience this is because the
haptic  visuality  responsible  for  their  perception  is  interruptive  and  dissensual,  it
collapses the rigorous distinction between the experience of seeing and that of touching
and lays bare an organoleptic indistinction, a disorganized body, a disfiguration of the
body’s organic constitution that Deleuze describes with the term “body without organs.”
What  we have  here  is  a  democracy  of  organs,  and rather  an immediate  democracy,
Panagia speaks of a temporary or provisional engagement, organization of the organs
(see 90,  109,  110,  146):  it  lasts as long as the sensation of  haptic visuality.  Linguistic
representation and narrative come always after the moment or durational intensity of
sensation. Haptic visuality is a mode of perception that makes narrativity insufficient to
the aesthetic experience of the image. At the moment of the encounter with the visual
image storytelling is not an adequate response. Or as the title of the Epilogue to this book
puts it: the painting, the photograph or the cinematic film “tell it all” (149). According to
Panagia, “the confrontation with the image itself, that is, with the force of representation
rather than its referent, is the important theoretical insight of Marin, Fried, and Deleuze”
(110). The aesthetic object must be engaged on its own terms, in light of its presentational
properties: it is an appearance of a singularity without model of resemblance: the image
is  its  own referent.  (But  can  we  not  say  the  same thing  precisely  for  the  linguistic
utterance or speech act? )
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11 In  the  last  chapter  “You’  re  Eating  Too  Fast!” Panagia  comes  again  to  this  anti-
aristocratic and democratic “body without organs” of the modern citizen subject who
turns his attention from the image to flavour, and from the organ of sight to the organ of
taste.  The  emergence  in  the  1980s  of  the  Slow  Food  Movement bears  witness  to  the
ambivalence of the mouth as a complex organ of political reflection: it is the locus of the
political art of speaking well (of “the democratic noise”) but also of the “art of eating
well” (138).  According to Panagia, flavor and the pleasure associated with it, is not just an
important thematic consideration in the history of political thought (in Plato, Kant and
Rousseau,  125-133)  but  also  what  is  politically  at  stake  today  with  the  ongoing
industrialization  and  standardization  of  a  globalized  gastronomy  (see  for  instance
McDonald’s  slogan  “One  taste  world  wide”).  Attending  to  the  primacy  of  sensory
experience,  and  affirming  a “dissensual  living  with  the  world”  that  values  the
divergences and particularities of tastes, textures and flavours, the Slow Food calls us to
realize  that  “our  mouths  are  the  loci  of  an  ethico-political  battle  of  geopolitical
proportions” (144-145). 
12 How does one respond to the appearance of a new image (flavour, sound, etc,) or of a
new subjectivity, especially when its presence and singularity disarticulates our received
normative  inheritances  and provokes  our  particularities?  The narratocratic  model  of
knowledge  and  its  politics  of  recognition  is  an  inadequate  ethical  response  to  the
advenience of a new (viewing, tasting, etc modern citizen) subject. The attendance of a
new appearance requires an act of admission: an appearance advenes upon us, without
foreseeing  it  or  expecting  it,  without  conventions  in  place  that  would  allow  as  to
recognize its identity, to ask its name, and we admit to it. “I admit to the appearance, to
the ‘monstrance’ of a new political subjectivity, not because I am obliged to recognize it
and give it a name, but because it is present before me” (152).
13 But  should  we  limit  the  attendance  or  admission  of  a  new  appearance,  and
consequently democratic equality and the democratic politics of sensation, to citizen and
fraternity (22, 43), to the human subject who lives always within the borders of some
nation-state and who is also my brother and compeer, as Panagia seems to do repeating
thereby the most traditional  and dominant line of  democratic thought? It  is  Panagia
himself, however, who gives us some reasons to resist this limitation, and precisely with
his own reference to the modern technologies of the image, as well as to the Christian
commitment to narratocracy (122). If citizenship has always been defined by inscription
within a nation-state whose body is rooted in a territory (lost, given or promised), and if
the circulation of images goes through borders, if that is, the technology of the image
(tele-vision) displaces places, then the question both of politics and of democracy should
no longer be tied to that of citizenship or to locality. And perhaps it should be dissociated
from the question of fraternity as well, which since St Paul has been inscribed within a
concept of cosmopolitanism, of world citizen, of human brotherhood as children of the
same Father/ God. 
14 Yannis Stamos, PhD. University of Warwick
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